rfc9771v1.txt		rfc9771.txt
	skipping to change at line 197 ¶		skipping to change at line 197 ¶
	* A deterministic operation of authenticated decryption has four		* A deterministic operation of authenticated decryption has four
	inputs, each a binary string: a secret key K of a fixed bit		inputs, each a binary string: a secret key K of a fixed bit
	length, a nonce N, associated data A, and a ciphertext C. The		length, a nonce N, associated data A, and a ciphertext C. The
	operation verifies the integrity of the ciphertext and		operation verifies the integrity of the ciphertext and
	associated data and decrypts the ciphertext. It returns a		associated data and decrypts the ciphertext. It returns a
	special symbol FAIL if the inputs are not authentic; otherwise,		special symbol FAIL if the inputs are not authentic; otherwise,
	the operation returns a plaintext P.		the operation returns a plaintext P.
	We note that specifications of AEAD algorithms that use		We note that specifications of AEAD algorithms that use
	authentication tags to ensure integrity MAY define it as an		authentication tags to ensure integrity may define the authentication
	independent output of the encryption operation and as an independent		tag as an independent output of the encryption operation and an
	input of the decryption operation. Throughout this document, by		independent input of the decryption operation. Throughout this
	default, we consider the authentication tag as part of the		document, by default, we consider the authentication tag as part of
	ciphertext.		the ciphertext.
	For more details on the AEAD definition, please refer to [RFC5116].		For more details on the AEAD definition, please refer to [RFC5116].
	Throughout this document, by default, we consider nonce-based AEAD		Throughout this document, by default, we consider nonce-based AEAD
	algorithms, which have an interface as defined above, and we give no		algorithms, which have an interface as defined above, and we give no
	other restrictions on their structure. However, some properties		other restrictions on their structure. However, some properties
	considered in the document apply only to particular classes of such		considered in the document apply only to particular classes of such
	algorithms, like AEAD algorithms based on block ciphers (such		algorithms, like AEAD algorithms based on block ciphers (such
	algorithms use a block cipher as a building block). If that is the		algorithms use a block cipher as a building block). If that is the
	case, we explicitly point that out in the corresponding section.		case, we explicitly point that out in the corresponding section.
	skipping to change at line 271 ¶		skipping to change at line 271 ¶
	We say that an AEAD algorithm provides security if it provides the		We say that an AEAD algorithm provides security if it provides the
	conventional properties listed in this section.		conventional properties listed in this section.
	4.2.1. Confidentiality		4.2.1. Confidentiality
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm guarantees that the plaintext is not available		An AEAD algorithm guarantees that the plaintext is not available
	to an active, nonce-respecting adversary.		to an active, nonce-respecting adversary.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	IND-CCA [BN2000] (or IND-CCA2 [S04])		IND-CCA [BN08] (or IND-CCA2 [S04])
	Synonyms:		Synonyms:
	Message privacy		Message privacy
	Notes:		Notes:
	Confidentiality against passive adversaries can also be		Confidentiality against passive adversaries can also be
	considered. The corresponding security notion is IND-CPA [BN2000]		considered. The corresponding security notion is IND-CPA [BN08]
	[R02].		[R02].
	Further reading:		Further reading:
	[R02], [BN2000], [S04]		[R02], [BN08], [S04]
	4.2.2. Data Integrity		4.2.2. Data Integrity
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm allows one to ensure that the ciphertext and the		An AEAD algorithm allows one to ensure that the ciphertext and the
	associated data have not been changed or forged by an active,		associated data have not been changed or forged by an active,
	nonce-respecting adversary.		nonce-respecting adversary.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	IND-CTXT [BN2000] (or AUTH [R02])		INT-CTXT [BN08] (or AUTH [R02])
	Synonyms:		Synonyms:
	Message authentication, authenticity		Message authentication, authenticity
	Further reading:		Further reading:
	[R02], [BN2000], [S04]		[R02], [BN08], [S04]
	4.2.3. Authenticated Encryption Security		4.2.3. Authenticated Encryption Security
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm provides confidentiality and data integrity		An AEAD algorithm provides confidentiality and data integrity
	against active, nonce-respecting adversaries.		against active, nonce-respecting adversaries.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	IND-CPA and IND-CTXT [BN2000] [R02] (or equivalently, IND-CCA3		IND-CPA and INT-CTXT [BN08] [R02] (or equivalently, IND-CCA3
	[S04])		[S04])
	Notes:		Notes:
	Please refer to [AEAD-LIMITS] for usage limits on modern AEAD		Please refer to [AEAD-LIMITS] for usage limits on modern AEAD
	algorithms used in IETF protocols.		algorithms used in IETF protocols.
	Further reading:		Further reading:
	[R02], [BN2000], [S04]		[R02], [BN08], [S04]
	4.3. Security Properties		4.3. Security Properties
	4.3.1. Blockwise Security		4.3.1. Blockwise Security
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm provides security even if an adversary can		An AEAD algorithm provides security even if an adversary can
	adaptively choose the next part of the plaintext depending on		adaptively choose the next part of the plaintext depending on
	already-computed ciphertext parts during an encryption operation.		already-computed ciphertext parts during an encryption operation.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	D-LORS-BCPA for confidentiality against passive adversaries, B-		D-LORS-BCPA for confidentiality against passive adversaries, B-
	INT-CTXT for integrity [EV17]; OAE1 [HRRV15] (a stronger notion;		INT-CTXT for integrity [EV17]; OAE1 [HRRV15] (a stronger notion;
	originally OAE (Online Authenticated Encryption) in [FFL12])		originally OAE (Online Authenticated Encryption) in [FFL12])
	Examples:		Examples:
	Deoxys [JNPS21], SAEF [ABV21]		Deoxys [JNPS21], SAEF [ABV21]
	Notes:		Notes:
	Blockwise security is highly relevant for streamable AEAD		Blockwise security is highly relevant for streamable AEAD
	algorithms (see Section 4.4.8). The OAE1 security notion [HRRV15]		algorithms (see Section 4.4.8). The OAE1 security notion [HRRV15]
	skipping to change at line 361 ¶		skipping to change at line 361 ¶
	4.3.2. Full Commitment		4.3.2. Full Commitment
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm guarantees that it is hard to find two or more		An AEAD algorithm guarantees that it is hard to find two or more
	different tuples of the key, nonce, associated data, and plaintext		different tuples of the key, nonce, associated data, and plaintext
	such that they encrypt to the same ciphertext. In other words, an		such that they encrypt to the same ciphertext. In other words, an
	AEAD scheme guarantees that a ciphertext is a commitment to all		AEAD scheme guarantees that a ciphertext is a commitment to all
	inputs of an authenticated encryption operation.		inputs of an authenticated encryption operation.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	CMT-4 [BH22], generalized CMT for a restricted setting (see the		CMT-4 [BH22], generalized CMT for a restricted setting (see the
	notes below) [MLGR23]		notes below) [MLGR23]
	Examples:		Examples:
	Ascon [DEMS21a] [DEMS21b] [YSS23], full committing versions of		Ascon [DEMS21a] [DEMS21b] [YSS23], full committing versions of
	Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GCM-SIV [BH22], generic		Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GCM-SIV [BH22], generic
	constructions [BH22] and [CR22]		constructions [BH22] and [CR22]
	Notes:		Notes:
	Full commitment can be considered in a weaker setting, where		Full commitment can be considered in a weaker setting, where
	skipping to change at line 394 ¶		skipping to change at line 394 ¶
	4.3.3. Key Commitment		4.3.3. Key Commitment
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm guarantees that it is hard to find two or more		An AEAD algorithm guarantees that it is hard to find two or more
	different keys and the same number of potentially equal triples of		different keys and the same number of potentially equal triples of
	nonce, associated data, and plaintext such that they encrypt to		nonce, associated data, and plaintext such that they encrypt to
	the same ciphertext under corresponding keys. In other words, an		the same ciphertext under corresponding keys. In other words, an
	AEAD scheme guarantees that a ciphertext is a commitment to the		AEAD scheme guarantees that a ciphertext is a commitment to the
	key used for an authenticated encryption operation.		key used for an authenticated encryption operation.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	CMT-1 [BH22]		CMT-1 [BH22]
	Synonyms:		Synonyms:
	Key robustness, key collision resistance		Key robustness, key collision resistance
	Examples:		Examples:
	Ascon [DEMS21a] [DEMS21b] [YSS23], generic constructions from		Ascon [DEMS21a] [DEMS21b] [YSS23], generic constructions from
	[BH22] and [CR22]		[BH22] and [CR22]
	Notes:		Notes:
	skipping to change at line 422 ¶		skipping to change at line 422 ¶
	Further reading:		Further reading:
	[BH22], [CR22], [FOR17], [LGR21], [GLR17]		[BH22], [CR22], [FOR17], [LGR21], [GLR17]
	4.3.4. Leakage Resistance		4.3.4. Leakage Resistance
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm provides security even if some additional		An AEAD algorithm provides security even if some additional
	information about computations of an encryption (and possibly		information about computations of an encryption (and possibly
	decryption) operation is obtained via side-channel leakages.		decryption) operation is obtained via side-channel leakages.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	CIL1 [GPPS19] (CIML2 [BPPS17] with leakages in decryption) for		CIL1 [GPPS19] (CIML2 [BPPS17] with leakages in decryption) for
	integrity, CCAL1 [GPPS19] (CCAmL2 [GPPS19] with leakages in		integrity, CCAL1 [GPPS19] (CCAmL2 [GPPS19] with leakages in
	decryption) for authenticated encryption security		decryption) for authenticated encryption security
	Examples:		Examples:
	Ascon [DEMS21a] [DEMS21b] (security under CIML2 and CCAL1 notions		Ascon [DEMS21a] [DEMS21b] (security under CIML2 and CCAL1 notions
	[B20]), TEDT [GPPS19]		[B20]), TEDT [GPPS19]
	Notes:		Notes:
	Leakages during AEAD operation executions are implementation-		Leakages during AEAD operation executions are implementation-
	skipping to change at line 481 ¶		skipping to change at line 481 ¶
	Further reading:		Further reading:
	[GPPS19], [B20], [BPPS17], [BMOS17]		[GPPS19], [B20], [BPPS17], [BMOS17]
	4.3.5. Multi-user Security		4.3.5. Multi-user Security
	Definition:		Definition:
	The security of an AEAD algorithm degrades slower than linearly		The security of an AEAD algorithm degrades slower than linearly
	with an increase in the number of users.		with an increase in the number of users.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	mu-ind [BT16]		mu-ind [BT16]
	Examples:		Examples:
	AES-GCM [D07], ChaCha20-Poly1305 [RFC8439], AES-GCM-SIV [RFC8452],		AES-GCM [D07], ChaCha20-Poly1305 [RFC8439], AES-GCM-SIV [RFC8452],
	AEGIS [AEGIS-AEAD]		AEGIS [AEGIS-AEAD]
	Notes:		Notes:
	It holds that for any AEAD algorithm, security degrades no worse		For any AEAD algorithm, security degrades no worse than linearly
	than linearly with an increase in the number of users [BT16].		with an increase in the number of users [BT16]. However, for some
	However, for some applications with a significant number of users,		applications with a significant number of users, better multi-user
	better multi-user guarantees are required. For example, in the		guarantees are required. For example, in the TLS 1.3 protocol,
	TLS 1.3 protocol, AEAD algorithms are used with a randomized nonce		AEAD algorithms are used with a randomized nonce
	(deterministically derived from a traffic secret and a sequence		(deterministically derived from a traffic secret and a sequence
	number) to address this issue. Using nonce randomization in block		number) to address this issue. Using nonce randomization in block
	cipher counter-based AEAD modes can contribute to multi-user		cipher counter-based AEAD modes can contribute to multi-user
	security [BT16]. Multi-user usage limits for AES-GCM and		security [BT16]. Multi-user usage limits for AES-GCM and
	ChaCha20-Poly1305 are provided in [AEAD-LIMITS].		ChaCha20-Poly1305 are provided in [AEAD-LIMITS].
	A weaker security notion, multi-user key recovery, is also		A weaker security notion, multi-user key recovery, is also
	introduced and thoroughly studied in [BT16]. While this document		introduced and thoroughly studied in [BT16]. While this document
	focuses on indistinguishability for security notions, key recovery		focuses on indistinguishability for security notions, key recovery
	might be relevant and valuable to study alongside		might be relevant and valuable to study alongside
	skipping to change at line 521 ¶		skipping to change at line 521 ¶
	[BT16], [HTT18], [LMP17], [DGGP21], [BHT18]		[BT16], [HTT18], [LMP17], [DGGP21], [BHT18]
	4.3.6. Nonce Hiding		4.3.6. Nonce Hiding
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm provides confidentiality for the nonce value		An AEAD algorithm provides confidentiality for the nonce value
	used to encrypt plaintext. The algorithm includes information		used to encrypt plaintext. The algorithm includes information
	about the nonce in the ciphertext and doesn't require the nonce as		about the nonce in the ciphertext and doesn't require the nonce as
	input for the decryption operation.		input for the decryption operation.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	AE2 [BNT19]		AE2 [BNT19]
	Examples:		Examples:
	Hide-Nonce (HN) transforms [BNT19]		Hide-Nonce (HN) transforms [BNT19]
	Notes:		Notes:
	As discussed in [BNT19], adversary-visible nonces might compromise		As discussed in [BNT19], adversary-visible nonces might compromise
	message and user privacy, similar to the way any metadata might.		message and user privacy, similar to the way any metadata might.
	As pointed out in [B13], even using a counter as a nonce value		As pointed out in [B13], even using a counter as a nonce value
	might compromise privacy. Designing a privacy-preserving way to		might compromise privacy. Designing a privacy-preserving way to
	skipping to change at line 552 ¶		skipping to change at line 552 ¶
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm provides security (resilience or resistance)		An AEAD algorithm provides security (resilience or resistance)
	even if an adversary can repeat nonces in its encryption queries.		even if an adversary can repeat nonces in its encryption queries.
	Nonce misuse resilience and resistance are defined as follows:		Nonce misuse resilience and resistance are defined as follows:
	Nonce misuse resilience: Security is provided for messages		Nonce misuse resilience: Security is provided for messages
	encrypted with non-repeated (fresh) nonces (correctly encrypted		encrypted with non-repeated (fresh) nonces (correctly encrypted
	messages).		messages).
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	CPA resilience (confidentiality), authenticity resilience		Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) resilience (confidentiality),
	(integrity), CCA resilience (authenticated encryption)		authenticity resilience (integrity), Chosen-Ciphertext
	[ADL17]		Attack (CCA) resilience (authenticated encryption) [ADL17]
	Examples:		Examples:
	ChaCha20-Poly1305 [RFC8439], AES-GCM [D07] (only		ChaCha20-Poly1305 [RFC8439], AES-GCM [D07] (only
	confidentiality)		confidentiality)
	Nonce misuse resistance: Security is provided for all messages		Nonce misuse resistance: Security is provided for all messages
	that were not encrypted with the same nonce value more than		that were not encrypted with the same nonce value more than
	once.		once.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	MRAE [RS06]		MRAE [RS06]
	Examples:		Examples:
	AES-GCM-SIV [RFC8452], Deoxys-II [JNPS21]		AES-GCM-SIV [RFC8452], Deoxys-II [JNPS21]
	Notes:		Notes:
	Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV) construction [RS06] is		Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV) construction [RS06] is
	a generic construction that provides nonce misuse		a generic construction that provides nonce misuse
	resistance.		resistance.
	skipping to change at line 587 ¶		skipping to change at line 587 ¶
	Nonce misuse resilience follows from nonce misuse resistance.		Nonce misuse resilience follows from nonce misuse resistance.
	Nonce misuse resistance does not follow from nonce misuse		Nonce misuse resistance does not follow from nonce misuse
	resilience.		resilience.
	Applications:		Applications:
	Any application where nonce uniqueness can't be guaranteed,		Any application where nonce uniqueness can't be guaranteed,
	security against fault-injection attacks and malfunctions,		security against fault-injection attacks and malfunctions,
	processes parallelization, full disk encryption		processes parallelization, full disk encryption
	Further reading:		Further reading:
	[RS06], [ADL17]		[RS06], [ADL17], [IIM25]
	4.3.8. Quantum Security		4.3.8. Quantum Security
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm provides security (in a Q1 or Q2 model) against		An AEAD algorithm provides security (in a Q1 or Q2 model) against
	a quantum adversary. Q1 and Q2 models are defined as follows:		a quantum adversary. Q1 and Q2 models are defined as follows:
	Q1 model: An adversary has access to local quantum computational		Q1 model: An adversary has access to local quantum computational
	power. It has classical access to encryption and decryption		power. It has classical access to encryption and decryption
	oracles.		oracles.
	skipping to change at line 638 ¶		skipping to change at line 638 ¶
	Further reading:		Further reading:
	[KLLNP16], [BBCLNSS21], [G17]		[KLLNP16], [BBCLNSS21], [G17]
	4.3.9. Reforgeability Resilience		4.3.9. Reforgeability Resilience
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm guarantees that once a successful forgery for		An AEAD algorithm guarantees that once a successful forgery for
	the algorithm has been found, it is still hard to find any		the algorithm has been found, it is still hard to find any
	subsequent forgery.		subsequent forgery.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	j-Int-CTXT [FLLW17]		j-Int-CTXT [FLLW17]
	Examples:		Examples:
	Deoxys [JNPS21], AEGIS [AEGIS-AEAD], Ascon [DEMS21a] [DEMS21b]		Deoxys [JNPS21], AEGIS [AEGIS-AEAD], Ascon [DEMS21a] [DEMS21b]
	Applications:		Applications:
	Voice over IP (VoIP), real-time streaming in a lightweight		Voice over IP (VoIP), real-time streaming in a lightweight
	setting, applications that require small ciphertext expansion		setting, applications that require small ciphertext expansion
	(i.e., short tags)		(i.e., short tags)
	Further reading:		Further reading:
	[BC09], [FLLW17]		[BC09], [FLLW17]
	4.3.10. Release of Unverified Plaintext (RUP) Integrity		4.3.10. Release of Unverified Plaintext (RUP) Integrity
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm provides data integrity even if plaintext is		An AEAD algorithm provides data integrity even if plaintext is
	released for every ciphertext, including those with failed		released for every ciphertext, including those with failed
	integrity verification.		integrity verification.
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	INT-RUP [A14]		INT-RUP [A14]
	Examples:		Examples:
	GCM-RUP [ADL17]		GCM [IIM25], GCM-RUP [ADL17]
	Applications:		Applications:
	Decryption with limited memory [FJMV2004], real-time streaming		Decryption with limited memory [FJMV2004], real-time streaming
	protocols		protocols
	Notes:		Notes:
	In [ADL17], a generic approach to achieve INT-RUP security is		In [ADL17], a generic approach to achieve INT-RUP security is
	introduced.		introduced.
	In the provided definition, we only consider integrity in the RUP		In the provided definition, we only consider integrity in the RUP
	setting, since confidentiality, in the usual sense, is		setting, since confidentiality, in the usual sense, is
	unachievable under RUP. In [A14], the notion of "Plaintext		unachievable under RUP. In [A14], the notion of "Plaintext
	Awareness" is introduced, capturing the best possible		Awareness" is introduced, capturing the best possible
	confidentiality under RUP in the following sense: "the adversary		confidentiality under RUP in the following sense: "the adversary
	cannot gain any additional knowledge about the plaintext from		cannot gain any additional knowledge about the plaintext from
	decryption queries besides what it can derive from encryption		decryption queries besides what it can derive from encryption
	queries".		queries".
	Further reading:		Further reading:
	[A14], [ADL17]		[A14], [ADL17], [IIM25]
	4.4. Implementation Properties		4.4. Implementation Properties
	4.4.1. Hardware Efficient		4.4.1. Hardware Efficient
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm ensures optimal performance when operating on		An AEAD algorithm ensures optimal performance when operating on
	hardware that complies with the specified requirements.		hardware that complies with the specified requirements.
	Notes:		Notes:
	skipping to change at line 709 ¶		skipping to change at line 709 ¶
	requirements for the AEAD to fulfill its intended purpose, as well		requirements for the AEAD to fulfill its intended purpose, as well
	as to match its performance and security claims.		as to match its performance and security claims.
	4.4.2. Inverse-Free		4.4.2. Inverse-Free
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm based on a given primitive can be implemented		An AEAD algorithm based on a given primitive can be implemented
	without invoking the inverse of that primitive.		without invoking the inverse of that primitive.
	Examples:		Examples:
	AES-GCM [D07], ChaCha20-Poly1305 [RFC8439], OCB [RFC7253], MGM		AES-GCM [D07], ChaCha20-Poly1305 [RFC8439], MGM [RFC9058], AEGIS
	[RFC9058], AEGIS [AEGIS-AEAD]		[AEGIS-AEAD]
	Notes:		Notes:
	In a sponge-based AEAD algorithm, an underlying permutation is		In a sponge-based AEAD algorithm, an underlying permutation is
	viewed as a primitive.		viewed as a primitive.
	4.4.3. Lightweight		4.4.3. Lightweight
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm can be efficiently and securely implemented on		An AEAD algorithm can be efficiently and securely implemented on
	resource-constrained devices. In particular, it meets the		resource-constrained devices. In particular, it meets the
	skipping to change at line 847 ¶		skipping to change at line 847 ¶
	When specifying security requirements for an AEAD algorithm in an		When specifying security requirements for an AEAD algorithm in an
	application, it SHOULD be indicated, for every required security		application, it SHOULD be indicated, for every required security
	property, whether only integrity or confidentiality is necessary.		property, whether only integrity or confidentiality is necessary.
	Additionally, for each security property, it SHOULD be specified		Additionally, for each security property, it SHOULD be specified
	whether an analysis in an alternative security notion is required.		whether an analysis in an alternative security notion is required.
	We also note that some additional properties come with trade-offs in		We also note that some additional properties come with trade-offs in
	terms of classical security and efficiency, and they may only be		terms of classical security and efficiency, and they may only be
	supported in non-standardized or modified AEAD algorithms. This		supported in non-standardized or modified AEAD algorithms. This
	immediately implies challenges in deployment and interoperability.		immediately implies challenges in deployment and interoperability.
	In an application, the requirements for additional AEAD properties		In an application, the requirements for additional AEAD properties
	SHOULD be highly motivated and justified, as should all trade-offs be		SHOULD be highly motivated and justified, and all trade-offs should
	carefully considered.		be carefully considered.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	This document has no IANA actions.		This document has no IANA actions.
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[D07] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of		[D07] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
	skipping to change at line 982 ¶		skipping to change at line 982 ¶
	187-220, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_7, 2018,		187-220, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_7, 2018,
	<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_7>.		<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_7>.
	[BMOS17] Barwell, G., Martin, D.P., Oswald, E., and M. Stam,		[BMOS17] Barwell, G., Martin, D.P., Oswald, E., and M. Stam,
	"Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side		"Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side
	Channel Leakage", Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017,		Channel Leakage", Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017,
	Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10624, pp.		Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10624, pp.
	693-723, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_24, 2017,		693-723, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_24, 2017,
	<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_24>.		<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_24>.
	[BN2000] Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated Encryption:		[BN08] Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated Encryption:
	Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic		Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic
	Composition Paradigm", Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT		Composition Paradigm", Journal of Cryptology, vol. 21, pp.
	2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1976, pp.		469-491, DOI 10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x, 2008,
	531-545, DOI 10.1007/3-540-44448-3_41, 2000,		<https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x>.
	<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44448-3_41>.
	[BNT19] Bellare, M., Ng, R., and B. Tackmann, "Nonces Are Noticed:		[BNT19] Bellare, M., Ng, R., and B. Tackmann, "Nonces Are Noticed:
	AEAD Revisited", Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2019,		AEAD Revisited", Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2019,
	Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 11692, pp.		Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 11692, pp.
	235-265, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9, 2019,		235-265, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9, 2019,
	<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9>.		<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9>.
	[BPPS17] Berti, F., Pereira, O., Peters, T., and F.-X. Standaert,		[BPPS17] Berti, F., Pereira, O., Peters, T., and F.-X. Standaert,
	"On Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption with		"On Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption with
	Decryption Leakages", IACR Transactions on Symmetric		Decryption Leakages", IACR Transactions on Symmetric
	skipping to change at line 1120 ¶		skipping to change at line 1119 ¶
	DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24, 2015,		DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24, 2015,
	<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24>.		<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24>.
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	Multi-user Security of GCM, Revisited: Tight Bounds for		Multi-user Security of GCM, Revisited: Tight Bounds for
	Nonce Randomization", Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC		Nonce Randomization", Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC
	Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS		Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS
	'18), pp. 1429-1440, DOI 10.1145/3243734.3243816, 2018,		'18), pp. 1429-1440, DOI 10.1145/3243734.3243816, 2018,
	<https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243816>.		<https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243816>.
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	Adaptive Attackers Revisiting the (In)Security of Some		Adaptive Attackers Revisiting the (In)Security of Some
	Provably Secure Encryption Modes: CBC, GEM, IACBC",		Provably Secure Encryption Modes: CBC, GEM, IACBC",
	Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2002, Lecture Notes in		Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2002, Lecture Notes in
	Computer Science, vol. 2442, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2,		Computer Science, vol. 2442, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2,
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	[JNPS21] Jean, M., Nikolić, I., Peyrin, T., and Y. Seurin, "The		[JNPS21] Jean, M., Nikolić, I., Peyrin, T., and Y. Seurin, "The
	Deoxys AEAD family", Journal of Cryptology, vol. 34, no.		Deoxys AEAD family", Journal of Cryptology, vol. 34, no.
	31, DOI 10.1007/s00145-021-09397-w, 2021,		31, DOI 10.1007/s00145-021-09397-w, 2021,
	skipping to change at line 1267 ¶		skipping to change at line 1272 ¶
	suffice.		suffice.
	For the examples given in this section, we leave it out of scope how		For the examples given in this section, we leave it out of scope how
	to concretely redefine conventional security for these classes; we		to concretely redefine conventional security for these classes; we
	only briefly describe the additional functionality they offer and		only briefly describe the additional functionality they offer and
	provide further references.		provide further references.
	A.1. Incremental Authenticated Encryption		A.1. Incremental Authenticated Encryption
	Definition:		Definition:
	An AEAD algorithm allows re-encrypting and authenticating a		For a message that only partly differs from some previous message,
	message (associated data and a plaintext pair), which only partly		an AEAD algorithm allows re-encrypting and authenticating that
	differs from some previous message, faster than processing it from		message (associated data and a plaintext pair) faster than
	scratch.		processing it from scratch.
	Examples:		Examples:
	Incremental AEAD algorithm of [SY16]		Incremental AEAD algorithm of [SY16]
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	Privacy, authenticity [SY16]		Privacy, authenticity [SY16]
	Notes:		Notes:
	When compared with conventional AEAD, the interface of an		When compared with conventional AEAD, the interface of an
	incremental AEAD algorithm is usually expanded with several		incremental AEAD algorithm is usually expanded with several
	operations, which perform different types of updates. For		operations, which perform different types of updates. For
	example, one can consider operations such as "Append" or "Chop",		example, one can consider operations such as "Append" or "Chop",
	which provide a straightforward additional functionality. A		which provide a straightforward additional functionality. A
	comprehensive definition of an incremental AEAD interface is		comprehensive definition of an incremental AEAD interface is
	provided in [SY16].		provided in [SY16].
	skipping to change at line 1304 ¶		skipping to change at line 1309 ¶
	expansion (the difference between the length of plaintext and		expansion (the difference between the length of plaintext and
	corresponding ciphertext) along with an input to the encryption		corresponding ciphertext) along with an input to the encryption
	operation. This feature enables the regulation of desired data		operation. This feature enables the regulation of desired data
	integrity guarantees, which depend on ciphertext expansion, for		integrity guarantees, which depend on ciphertext expansion, for
	each particular application while using the same algorithm		each particular application while using the same algorithm
	implementation.		implementation.
	Examples:		Examples:
	AEZ [HKR2015]		AEZ [HKR2015]
	Security notion:		Security notions:
	RAE [HKR2015]		Robust Authenticated Encryption (RAE) [HKR2015]
	Notes:		Notes:
	The security goal of robust AEAD algorithms is to ensure the best		The security goal of robust AEAD algorithms is to ensure the best
	possible security, even with small ciphertext expansion (referred		possible security, even with small ciphertext expansion (referred
	to as stretch). For instance, analyzing any AEAD algorithm with a		to as stretch). For instance, analyzing any AEAD algorithm with a
	one-byte stretch for conventional integrity reveals insecurity, as		one-byte stretch for conventional integrity reveals insecurity, as
	the probability of forging a ciphertext is no less than 1/256.		the probability of forging a ciphertext is no less than 1/256.
	Nonetheless, from the robust AEAD perspective, an algorithm with		Nonetheless, from the robust AEAD perspective, an algorithm with
	such forgery probability for a one-byte ciphertext expansion is		such forgery probability for a one-byte ciphertext expansion is
	secure, representing the best achievable security in that		secure, representing the best achievable security in that
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